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The Construction of the Modern West 
and the Backward Rest 
in Hofstede's Culture's Consequences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
An increasingly globalized business environment and a strongly held corporate belief that the 
world can be rationally managed have brought forth a growing demand for normative models 
dealing   with   cross-cultural   management   issues.   Cross-cultural   management   has   thus 
established itself as a significant research field, with much of the initial inspiration coming from 
Hofstede and his influential cultural model from 1980. In this article, our aim is not to merely 
repeat the already formulated objections to the latter model, concerning its ontology, 
epistemology and methodology, but rather to focus on the very words of Hofstede himself in his 
second  edition  of  Culture’s  Consequences  (2001).  With  a  broadly  postcolonial  sensibility, 
drawing  on  authors  such  as  Said  and  Escobar,  we  contend  that  Hofstede  discursively 
constructs a world characterized by a division between a ‘developed and modern’ side (mostly 
‘Anglo-Germanic’ countries) and a ‘traditional and backward’ side (the rest) and discuss the 
cultural consequences of such colonial discourse. 
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Introduction 
 
During the last two decades, which have witnessed a growing internationalization and 
globalization of businesses, there has been an increased urge among organizations to improve 
their knowledge about cultural differences between nations, and thus a growing demand for 
normative models dealing with cross-cultural issues in business, with the underlying assumption 
that such models could serve as competitive devices in the conquest of the global market. 
Studies in this field are usually characterized by a comparative nature and a main interest in 
contrasts between different cultural – and usually national – contexts. Much of the initial 
inspiration for the setting-up of this distinctive field can be argued to have come from Hofstede’s 
(1980) seminal study, Culture’s Consequences. Hofstede’s model is made up of four (later five) 
cultural dimensions (Hofstede 1980; 1991; 2001): ‘Power Distance’, ‘Uncertainty Avoidance’, 
‘Individualism’ and ‘Masculinity’ (and later ‘Long-Term Orientation’). These dimensions were 
identified by Hofstede as a result of statistical analyses of surveys involving people from 66 
countries – but only one multinational company. Each of the national cultures involved was 
assigned a score on each of the four original dimensions: that has allowed many researchers to 
compare national cultures and make claims about cultural differences on the basis of such 
supposedly objective measures. 
In this paper, our aim is not to merely repeat the already formulated criticisms concerning 
ontology, epistemology and methodology, but rather to focus on the very words of Hofstede 
himself, in his second edition of Culture’s Consequences (2001). What is interesting is that 
some of Hofstede’s main purposes in writing this second edition have been to address the 
criticisms that his work received in the previous twenty years, and to demonstrate that the 
results are (still) valid. It even seems, as Smith (2002) notices, that Hofstede wishes to extend 
the relevance of his model to wider societal and world issues – as is shown, for instance, in the 
new, broader title. Beyond his rigorous quantitative approach, it is the way he comments on his 
results that serves to legitimate this claim for extended relevance. He calls this an ‘exercise in 
induction’ (Hofstede, 2001: 97), which he claims is based on ‘intuition’. Our main aim here will 
be to analyze the discourse that is conveyed by Hofstede’s comments on his results. For this 
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analysis, we will find inspiration in works characterized by a broadly postcolonial sensibility, 
such  as  Said’s  (1995)  and  Escobar’s  (1995)  –  both  inspired  by  Foucault’s  (1971;  1979) 
approach to discourse. We will analyze how the discussion of each of the five dimensions 
produces the ‘other’ national cultures discursively, from a Eurocentric – or, perhaps rather, an 
‘Anglo-Germanic’-centric – point of view. 
 
After this introduction, we will present Hofstede’s model, the many criticisms that have been 
mounted on it, and how a ‘discourse analysis’ approach differs from these criticisms. We will 
then  move  on  to  our  methodology  and  explain  how  it  relates  to  critical  analysis  in  the 
postcolonial tradition – as especially laid out by Said and Escobar – and to Weber’s (1978) 
seminal study. Our analysis will follow, with some preliminary observations and then a critical 
examination of how each of Hofstede’s dimensions contributes to the broad discourse. Before 
wrapping up the paper with our conclusions, we will point out some of the implications of the 
discourse in terms of disciplinary power broadly speaking, and of how it might be seen as a neo- 
colonial discourse more specifically. 
 
Hofstede’s model 
 
In this paper, we are focusing on Hofstede’s 2001 volume Culture’s Consequences: Comparing 
Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations. On the whole, this edition 
does  not  change  or  modify  any  of  his  basic  conclusions  presented  in  his  pioneer  study 
(Hofstede, 1980). What mainly characterizes this edition is that it comprises data from 10 of the 
African and Middle East countries which earlier were excluded because of instability of data, 
three new chapters dealing with organizational culture, intercultural encounters and the 
application of his dimensions, and a more thoroughly explained analysis, supported by 63 of his 
own publications and other scholars’ replication, extension and validity tests on his cultural 
model. Although the contents of this edition have been extended, our interest here is mainly 
focused on the discursive construction of his five cultural dimensions: Power Distance, 
Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism, Masculinity, and Long Term Orientation. The extended 
title in his 2001 edition along with recurrent references to his findings as ‘evidence’ reveals his 
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ambition to broaden the relevance of his model to wider societal and world issues (cf. Smith, 
 
2002) as well as his concern for the model to maintain its validity. 
 
Even though Hofstede’s research has been considered groundbreaking in many scholarly 
quarters, significant criticism has been raised against his cultural model over the years. For 
example, his work has been criticized for being vague and contradictory and for lacking basic 
theory (Cray & Mallory, 1998: 57). It has also been criticized for being based on time-worn 
secondary data collected during 1968 and 1972 in only one multinational organization, and for 
including a too limited sample of mostly white marketing and salesmen (Smith, 2002). More 
importantly, severe criticism has been raised towards the essentialistic conception of national 
culture,  which  instead  of  recognizing  nations as  ‘imagined  communities’  (Anderson,  1983) 
depicts them as historically determined, homogeneous and static entities (Cray & Mallory, 1998; 
Kwek, 2003). A criticism that is directly connected to this static conception of culture stresses 
the fact that Hofstede’s study concerns perceptions of values and behaviour that are observed 
within the context of the national cultures as a basis for comparison. It has been argued that 
focusing directly on interactions would be more relevant (Bartholomew & Adler, 1996; Holden, 
2002) because ‘observations about how individuals interact with one another in their home 
country may not provide useful guidance for how the same people behave towards foreign 
visitors’ (Cray & Mallory, 1998: 90), nor does it tell how they will cope abroad if they come to be 
expatriates. Another main shortcoming in Hofstede’s framework (also connected to the 
essentialistic, static view) is its strongly functionalist and quantitative nature, which focuses on 
measuring phenomena that should not – and, to many, cannot - be narrowly seen as 
quantifyable. Moreover, some scholars claim that Hofstede’s study does not concern culture per 
se, but instead reveals organizational members’ perception of values and behaviour (e.g. 
Bartholomew & Adler, 1996; Roberts & Boyacigillier, 1984). Another significant objection 
highlighted by opponents is that the study, despite its claim to the contrary, contributes to the 
reproduction of ethnocentrism (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1997; Kwek, 2003; 
McSweeney, 2002). While Hofstede, according to Kwek’s (2003: 138) observation, ‘questions 
the ethnocentric tendencies of researchers who utilize his dimensions’, the very same Hofstede 
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fails to question ‘the ethnocentric origins of his own dimensions or methodology, [or] the 
implications  of  such  tools  for  marginalizing  other  knowledges’.  Kwek  thus  considers  that 
Western cross-cultural management can be seen and criticized as a ‘colonial discourse’. 
However,  despite  the  criticism  that  his  model  has  been  subjected  to  over  the  years, 
Hofstede has never recognized any significant errors or weaknesses in his research 
(McSweeney, 2002). On the contrary, many of his efforts at responding to the criticism have 
been aiming at showing that his ‘scientific’ approach, methods, and findings are sound and 
valid. Moreover, in his ambition to convince the reader that his cultural model and hierarchical 
ordering of countries is not only valid, but also will remain so for years to come. Hofstede 
explains that ‘any kind of change would affect all countries in the same way’ – leading thus to a 
status quo. It is, he argues, ‘only if on a dimension one country leapfrogs over another that the 
validity of the original scores will be reduced’ (Hofstede, 2001: 36). The chance for this to 
happen is according to his estimation fairly unlikely. Hence, rather than treating culture as 
changeable, the cultural model normalizes the idea of historical determinism and stability. 
What seems to characterize the criticism towards Hofstede’s study is that most of it is 
concerned with the validity of his model from a Western ‘scientific’ viewpoint. Considering this 
focus of interest, it appears that the great majority of scholars within cross-cultural management 
research share a concern for a scientific knowledge deeply rooted within a Western rationality. 
As far as we understand, the strong focus on this aspect can be explained by the fact that the 
claim that Hofstede’s approach is solidly based on a scientifically appropriate methodology 
basically is what legitimates the discourse and what has allowed for its institutionalization as 
valid scientific knowledge. Such an institutionalization is of utmost importance and is understood 
as constituting the very foundation of ‘disciplinary power’ (Foucault, 1979). A text claiming to 
contain such knowledge is therefore not easily dismissed as it will be perceived as academically 
prestigious and treated as experts’ reports (cf. Said, 1995). On the contrary, although 
methodological arbitrariness reduces the ‘reality’ it is supposed to disclose, it contributes to the 
production of a discourse with one accepted way of looking at the world. 
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Our approach differs from current critics in the sense that we are not concerned about the 
 
‘scientific’ method and the validity of his model per se. Instead, we take an interest in his text 
and the discourse that has acquired power thanks to the ‘textual attitude’ (Said, 1995:94) that 
characterizes its audience. As Said  explains, a textual attitude is created upon a unified belief 
that ‘the complex world in which we live can be understood on the basis of what is described in 
a book’. According to Said there are two situations which favour such an attitude. One is when a 
human-being confronts at close range something relatively unknown and threatening and 
previously distant. In such a case one can handle the situation by finding support either in 
previous resembling experiences or what one has read about it. A second situation favouring 
the textual attitude is the appearance of success. What we argue is that cross-cultural 
management discourse not only produces the ‘contents’ of national cultures, but also shapes 
people’s subjectivities in many ways. Drawing on insights from postcolonial theory and the 
Foucauldian notion of power (Foucault, 1971), the purpose of our paper is to explore how 
Hofstede’s  model,  through  its  reproduction  of  pre-existing  ideologies  originating  in  the 
Protestant  ethic  (see  Weber,  1978)  and  effected  in  modern  discourses  such  as  that  of 
‘development’ (see Escobar, 1995), divides the world in two, with one side conceived of as 
 
‘developed and modern’ and another side conceived of as ‘traditional and backward’. 
 
 
 
Theoretical influences and research method 
 
Before proceeding with our exploring of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions some words on our 
research method and our theoretical influences are in order. Let us start with postcolonial theory 
which is the major source of inspiration in our analysis of Hofstede’s text. The main reasons why 
we are interested in postcolonial ideas are because they deal with the contemporary legacy of 
colonialism and its influences on the perception of culture. Colonialism was one of the most 
profound and significant experiences that from a European perspective shaped the Western 
world’s perception of non-Western people (cf. Bhabha, 1994; Prasad, 2003; Said, 1995). It was 
Said’s (1995; originally published in 1978) historical investigation of Orientalism that awakened 
many scholars’ interests in studying past and present discursive encounters between the West 
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and its Others. After developing first within literary studies (e.g. Bhabha, 1990; Spivak, 1988), 
postcolonial theory began to affect other disciplines and came to deeply influence scholars from 
history (Chakrabarty, 2000; MacKenzie, 1995), anthropology (Appadurai, 1996; Clifford, 1988; 
Thomas, 1994), broader cultural studies (Gilroy, 1987), gender studies (Mills, 1992; Mohanty, 
1984), human geography (Gregory, 1994; Jackson and Jacobs, 1996) and, more recently, 
organization and critical management studies (Cook, 2003; Mir et al., 2003; Prasad, 1997; 
2003).To date a postcolonial deconstruction of Hofstede’s model has been, to our knowledge, 
attempted only once (Kwek, 2003), but mostly focusing the critique on the reductionism, 
essentialism and representationalism – ‘the belief that theories are attempts to accurately 
describe and represent reality’ (Kwek, 2003: 125) – that characterize the framework, without 
going into the textual details of Hofstede’s own comments on his results. 
One of the conceptual inventions that gained immediate support in early colonialism and 
which is intimately linked to the hierarchical ordering of nations is the idea of ‘race’. As pointed 
out by Ashcroft et al. (2002: 198-9) ‘race’ became an important imperialistic concept because it 
translated the colonial oppression into a justifying theory. European ‘race’ thinking initiated a 
hierarchy of human variations which placed the Europeans in a position superior to people 
within the expropriated territories. Although ‘culture’ and ‘ethnicity’ have come to replace the 
less euphonious concept of ‘race’, we argue that the legacy of colonial thinking is still discernible 
in  the  hierarchical  ordering  of  nations  and  the  choice  of  cultural  attributes  employed  in 
Hofstede’s description of people’s values and behavioural patterns. 
Another reason why we are particularly inspired by ideas from postcolonial studies is 
because cross-cultural management in general and Hofstede’s hierarchically ordered cultural 
dimensions  in  particular  are  subsumed  under  the  dominant  discourses  of  ‘modernity’, 
‘development’, and ‘rational economy’ which emerged – at least partly - as a result of the 
colonial conquests. It was, as Ashcroft et al. (2002) points out, when the notion of European 
superiority became crucial for justifying the expropriation of territories that ‘modern’ became 
synonymous with ‘progress’, ‘development’ and ‘civilized behaviour’, and ‘rationality’ and the 
creation of ‘truth’ became core features of modern thought. It was thus the Europeans’ will to 
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dominate which encouraged them to construct the image of a traditional, static and pre-historic 
non-European world. To Foucault (1971), it is the shift from the ‘power of rhetoric’ to the ‘power 
of  truth’,  which  he  considers  to have  taken place  in  classical  time, that  gave  rise to the 
‘discourse of modernity’. Similarly, the colonial discourse produced knowledge about the 
colonized, third, and fourth worlds constructed upon mysticism and prejudice, knowledge which 
was protected by the assertion of the superiority of ‘scientific truth’. Influenced by Foucault’s 
conception of discourse, Said (1995) argued that the colonizing of the Orient is best understood 
as a discourse by which the Occidental center was able to manage and produce the Oriental 
periphery. Emphasizing that all Occidental discourses about the Orient are determined by the 
will to dominate over Oriental territories and people, Said suggests that the representation of the 
‘other’ is accomplished within an institutional system of scholarship. It is further pointed out by 
Prasad and Prasad (2002) that such a shaping of ‘otherness’ takes place in the discursive 
practice rather than on a level of individual and institutional beliefs. 
The  colonial  discourse  and  its  image  of  the  world  were  presumably  strengthened  by 
Weber’s search for the roots of ‘modernity’ within the protestant ethic. In effect, even though it 
may not have been Weber’s intention, his seminal study (1978) did encourage him to argue that 
there was a difference between Western and non-Western economic mentalities. To Weber the 
industrial revolution required a disciplinary society because people did not generally change 
their country life for the city and a work in the factory by their own choice (Escobar, 1995). It 
required a convincing motive to attract people to the industries and Protestantism, and its 
Calvinist variant in particular, was apparently a successful tool for this mission since it directed 
the desire for salvation into a distinctive set of motives that encouraged rational, methodical 
action to master the world. The protestant ethic thereby contributed to the development of 
rational capitalism by encouraging accumulation of wealth as a path to salvation. It did so by 
restraining the enjoyment of wealth, by fostering methodical economic calculation of profit and 
loss, by promoting honesty and predictability in business practice, and by encouraging hard, 
disciplined work (Swidler, 2001: 80). As pointed out by Said (1995), Weber influenced the 
construction of the Orient and the view of the Oriental’s economic incapability by assuming the 
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Orient to be a mystical, feudal and anti-rational place which lacked all those characteristics that 
had made European progress possible. According to scholars like Escobar (1995) and Banerjee 
(2003), the assumption of capitalism being the only way to think in the contemporary world is 
also quite clearly connected to the ‘development’ discourse and, for instance, its construction of 
the ‘Third World’ – a concept which was invented as a result of Truman’s vision to transform all 
countries in the world to economically and technologically advanced societies and which almost 
overnight made two thirds of the world’s population poor (Escobar, 1995). 
The long-standing academic tradition in combination with the faith attributed to ‘scientific 
methods’ have most certainly contributed to the construction of expert opinions which have 
legitimized a way of thinking about ‘self’ and ‘others’ originating in Eurocentric discourses.  We 
argue that, as a result, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are subsumed under these dominant 
discourses and that his argumentative construction of the five cultural dimensions - Power 
Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism, Masculinity, and Long Term Orientation – is 
inescapably linked to them. Our paper focuses on Hofstede’s 2001 edition not only because this 
book comprises his research over the past 20 years, but more importantly because we attempt 
to explore how his cultural dimensions function as a model for producing and maintaining 
disciplinary power. We adopt Foucault’s (1971) approach to discourse referring to a bounded 
area of social knowledge and maintain that the ‘will to truth’ with its linkage to power, has 
provided for the ‘scientific’ method and its encouragement of a collective understanding of 
culture. The Foucauldian meaning of discourse is less concerned with specific interaction but 
rather with how a discourse or a set of discourses comes to constitute objects and subjects 
(Potter, 1997). Similar to Foucault’s argument that power is exercized to produce and control 
individual subjects through a system of knowledge and that subjectivity is produced by 
disciplinary discourse, it could be argued that national culture is not simply out there for 
everybody to learn about and adjust to, but brought into being by a prevailing discursive system. 
We have chosen to focus on the three aspects of Hofstede's (2001) discussion which, in our 
view, show how the colonial mindset is kept alive in the worldview he offers. In our analysis, we 
are particularly interested in 1) his conception of culture and more specifically if he treats it as 
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dynamic or conceives of it as historically determined and stable, because essentializing ‘the 
other’ is one of the powerful tricks of colonial discourse; 2) the basic oppositions that he lays out 
between different sides regarding each dimension, because all colonial representation is based 
on sharp binary oppositions between the civilized / developed metropole and the territories in 
need of civilization / development; and 3) the rhetoric and arguments that he uses to convince 
the reader of the relevance and validity of his findings, because they are what makes his textual 
representation potentially powerful, when strengthened by a scientific legitimacy, for instance 
through establishing correlations. These three aspects are connected to each other in the sense 
that each potentially contributes to the power of the neo-colonial discourse. 
 
Analysis1 
 
As with any book, the first impression that Culture’s Consequences gives to the reader is 
through its very title. It conveys the idea that situations stem from culture, i.e. that culture can be 
blamed for a variety of phenomena at the level of nations; for instance, underdevelopment or 
autocracy. Understood as ‘programming of the mind’ - or ‘software of the mind’ as the subtitle to 
the other famous book by Hofstede (1991) goes -, culture, rather than geography or history, is 
used as the universal explanation. It thus seems that Hofstede’s ambition is to demonstrate that 
a few ‘cultural dimensions’ (which we rather would think of merely as symptoms of the 
consequences of complex historical dynamics) can be considered as universal causes for 
differences regarding phenomena such as ‘development’, ‘modernity’ or ‘democracy’. 
Indeed, for each dimension, Hofstede discusses its ‘origins and implications’. He comments 
on  these  through  instrumentalizing  some  of  the  correlations  he  finds  in  order  to  make 
conclusions regarding wider phenomena (such as the three listed above) – phenomena which 
are typically of importance to, and tend to be defined by, Western, ‘developed’ countries. While 
the dimensions may well be symptoms of certain values being expressed, it is quite clear that 
trying to ‘explain’ where they come from is quite a speculative activity – based on ‘intuition’ (p. 
97) according to Hofstede himself. This ‘exercise in induction’ (ibid.) is indeed claimed by 
 
Hofstede to be reminiscent of archaeological work, in that archaeologists rely upon ‘intuition’. 
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One could assume that Hofstede’s intuition is based on some kind of preconceived view of the 
world that he makes use of when constructing his five cultural dimensions. In any case, why 
would there be ‘implications’ of these particular constructions? Obviously, nothing proves that 
‘culture’ would be ‘essentially’ made up of these dimensions, which are arbitrary constructions 
 
applying to hypothetical ‘societal norms’. 
 
 
 
Power Distance: Being modern is being equal 
 
The Power Distance Index (PDI) is perhaps the most significant dimension from a postcolonial 
viewpoint, because all the ‘good cultures’ seem to be on the same side. It appears that ‘low PDI’ 
is overwhelmingly presented as the desirable inclination. Hofstede’s exhibit 3.10 (p. 118) clearly 
suggests that the ‘low PDI’ side is better, at least from his Western, supposedly rational and 
universally fair viewpoint: this side is deemed to be more technological, more legal, more 
modern, more urban, more educated, more literate, more wealthy, more democratic, more fair, 
more equal, less imperialistic (!), less centralized, more questioning of authority, characterized 
by more social mobility, a bigger middle class, better wealth distribution, a more representative 
political power, an the list could go on. This pretty much represents the idea of a ‘first world’ 
(which happens to be overwhelmingly Western, ‘Anglo-Germanic’, and Protestant) depicted as 
rather coherent despite a number of rather shocking allegations – like presenting the United 
States or the United Kingdom as on the ‘less imperialistic’ side, or as among the ‘more equal’ 
societies. 
At the core of all these oppositions, there seems to be a fundamental distinction between 
ideas of ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’, of ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ man. Citing Triandis (1971: 8), 
Hofstede (p. 211) is trying to convince us that the division of the world in a modern and 
economically developed part and a traditional underdeveloped part is due to the fact that they 
are inhabited by ‘modern’ versus ‘traditional’ people. 
 
Modern man [...] is open to new experiences; relatively independent of parental 
authority; concerned with time, planning, willing to defer gratification; he feels 
that man can be the master over nature, and that he controls the reinforcements 
he receives from his environment; he believes in determinism and science; he 
has a wide, cosmopolitan perspective, he uses broad in-groups; he competes 
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with standards of excellence, and he is optimistic about controlling his 
environment. Traditional man has narrow in-groups, looks at the world with 
suspicion, believes that good is limited and one obtains a share of it by chance 
or pleasing the gods; he identifies with his parents and receives direction from 
them; he considers planning a waste of time, and does not defer gratification; he 
feels at the mercy of obscure environmental factors, and is prone to m ysticism; 
he sees interpersonal relations as an end, rarely as means to an end; he does 
not believe that he can control his environment but rather sees himself under 
the influence of external, mystical powers. 
 
 
 
One way that Hofstede’s rhetoric proceeds is through making these generalizations where 
all ‘low-PDI’ and ‘high-PDI’ countries are supposed to be represented by straight oppositions, 
and to justify some of the assertions through comparison with some chosen suitable countries 
from one group or the other. An interesting example of that approach could be Hofstede’s claim 
that equality is more a ‘factual’ matter in protestant countries, and more ‘ideological’ in catholic 
countries. We are encountering here one of the limits of Hofstede’s approach examining only 
one company and values expressed by white middle aged men with similar occupations in sales 
and marketing: there is no reason why what may be true at the level of this company in different 
countries (regarding issues like ‘equality’ or ‘democracy’) should have to be true at the level of 
national societies. But it is part of Hofstede’s discourse to present what happens in companies 
as also what happens in the society – or in those layers of society that he finds relevant for his 
agenda. Only in this way is it possible to maintain that the Western (protestant) countries are 
‘factually’ more equal and democratic than others. 
 
Another illustration of Hofstede’s selective choice of examples can be found when he 
discusses ‘evidence of a negative correlation of PDI with peak scientific performance’ (p. 101). 
This ‘evidence’ is based on the ‘Nobel index’ and the example that Hofstede takes is France, 
which is ‘only’ ranked ninth. Beyond the unconvincing nature of this argument, what is most 
striking is that Hofstede justifies his claim that high-PDI countries are less performant 
scientifically by giving just one example (p.101). 
When (briefly) addressing the effect that colonization may have had on colonized countries 
in his text, Hofstede indulges again in the ‘one example to justify the whole’ rhetoric: he claims 
(p. 120) that ‘traditional precolonial relationships also contained elements of large inequality: 
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there is no better example than the Indian caste system’, intending to demonstrate that the high 
PDI found in most former colonies is not due to having been colonized. Once again, one 
extreme example is supposed to account for all ‘high-PDI former colonies’. In the end, even 
though he often uses only one example at a time, all the examples add up in the mind of the 
reader to lay out the worldview that there is one side of the world (mostly the ‘protestant’ 
countries) that is more modern and the other side that is more backward. 
 
Uncertainty Avoidance: Being modern is being flexible 
 
The Uncertainty Avoidance index (UAI) perhaps does not allow for such a clear opposition as 
PDI does. However, while the ‘low-UAI’ side may not be presented in such an overwhelmingly 
superior way as the ‘low-PDI’ one was, we still get the picture that it is more desirable than 
being ‘high-UAI’. For instance, Hofstede claims that ‘it seems that in higher-UAI countries 
innovations are more difficult to bring about’ (p. 167). This claim is based on a study by Shane 
(1993) allegedly demonstrating that ‘less uncertainty-avoiding cultures showed higher rates of 
innovation in terms of trademarks granted’ (ibid.). One aspect that is quite reminiscent of the 
PDI discussion is that UAI is also characterized by a quite clear divide between protestant (low- 
UAI) and catholic (high-UAI) countries. A number of fairly obvious contradictions (especially with 
the conclusions that were drawn from high-PDI countries) seem to stem from this basic 
opposition. For instance, a low-UAI feature is presented as entailing much more moral tolerance 
than a high-UAI feature. This seems in clear contradiction with, for instance, the claim that 
catholic, high-PDI countries would be characterized by people taking more liberty with moral 
issues. Among other things, this idea of tolerance also implies that low-UAI countries are 
supposed to be more tolerant towards immigrants, an interesting assertion given the recent 
developments in Northern Europe. 
These apparent contradictions in Hofstede’s text on UAI can probably be explained by a 
simplification that seems to equate the amount of rules with how significant the rules are and 
how they direct human behaviour. While there may indeed be more rules, perhaps stemming 
from more ‘demanding’ religions, in so-called high-UAI societies, what Hofstede fails – or does 
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not want – to see is that a bigger amount of rules does not necessarily tend to make people 
more rule-abiding. Now, no matter whether Hofstede fails to see that or deliberately ignores it, 
his text conveys certain impressions as to how non-protestant, high-UAI people are supposed to 
be: obedient, subjected to strong rules and social control, and not very open-minded (implying 
that if those countries do not ’develop’ or ’grow’ enough it is because they are not ready or 
willing to change – to the Western-protestant capitalist ways - quickly enough). That the social 
control in Northern European countries – regarding the inflexibility around time issues or the all- 
knowing administration, for instance – is among the world’s strongest does not matter here. 
What is implied is that those countries that do not share the low-UAI values like e.g. work 
flexibility (a great tool for US-style capitalism) are before all too conservative – otherwise they 
would have adjusted to the Western-protestant way, since it is so desirable. 
 
 
 
Individualism: Being modern is being individualistic 
 
Similar to PDI, but with an even more obvious distance between the West and the rest of the 
world, Individualism (IDV) is the dimension which according to Hofstede correlates the most with 
‘modernity‘. As stated by Hofstede, IDV is among those dimensions empirically found in the IBM 
data (p. 211) which is most closely linked to a country’s level of ‘economic development’. If we 
are to judge from his statement that the questionnaire ‘could as well be called a “modernity 
questionnaire”’ since eleven of the thirteen questions are related to ‘modernism’, it appears that 
the concept was defined beforehand and drawn on a kind of ‘intuition’ based on preconceived 
knowledge about the effects of individualistic versus collectivistic behaviour. Similar to PDI, it is 
also the dimension which most significantly echoes the legacy of colonialism and its idea of a 
superior Western world and an inferior rest. As is evident from the exhibit 5.10 (p. 254), high 
IDV is associated with more economic development, more wealth, a greater social mobility and 
stronger development of middle class, a more modern and more urban society, a lower birth 
rate, a more universal education system, and an individualistic thinking. On the contrary, a 
collectivistic country is claimed to be characterized by less economic development, less social 
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mobility and a weak development of middle class, an extended or tribal family structure, more 
children per parent couple, a traditional education system and a collective thinking. 
What  is  noteworthy  in  Hofstede’s  rhetoric  is  that  while  IDV  is  commented  upon  with 
positively loaded attributes, collectivist values are, on the contrary, discussed through rather 
negative associations. For example, while low-IDV countries are characterized by a rigid social 
and occupational class system, high-IDV countries are characterized by social and occupational 
mobility (p. 251). While individualist societies are supposed to represent a modernist ethic with 
an equal law system, collectivist societies are supposed to represent traditional ethics and a law 
system which is built on traditions and religion. Moreover, while within the high-IDV cultures 
individualism is considered good and science and technology treated as a matter of fact, low- 
IDV cultures are argued to treat science and technology as magic and to consider the placing of 
the individual interest before the collective good as evil. The use of terms which portray the ‘self’ 
as modern and progressive and the ‘others’ as backward clearly reverberates the legacy of a 
colonial thinking. This idea of inferiority and backwardness is discernible also in the way that 
collective value patterns in these so-called traditional societies are supposed to set a limit of the 
possibilities for economic development. According to Hofstede’s analysis there is an ‘obvious 
relationship between the organization’s technology and the position of its members along the 
continuum from individualism to collectivism’. Drawing on earlier studies from Stinchcombe 
(1965: 145), he claims that ‘technologies developed in Western individualist settings more or 
less presuppose an individualist mentality in entrepreneurs, managers, and workers, which is 
part of “modernity”’ (p. 213). Introducing such technologies in more collectivist countries 
represents one of the main forces toward a shift of societal norms in those countries. On the 
other hand, the collectivist value pattern in more traditional societies sets a limit on possibilities 
for transferring technologies; this is one of the dilemmas of the economic development of poor 
countries. One solution that is suggested is the transfer of ‘intermediate’ or ‘appropriate’ 
technologies that are better adapted to what already exists in the traditional collectivist societies’ 
(p.  213).  As  can  be  understood  from  Hofstede’s  discourse,  a  prerequisite  for  economic 
development in non-Western societies is an adjustment to the Western standards and life-style 
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since this apparently is the only way to gain prosperity – an argument hardly based on solid 
ground judging by the development of certain Asian countries. 
Furthermore, individualistic countries, which not surprisingly turn out to be located in the 
Western world (e.g. USA, Austria, Great Britain, Canada, Netherlands) are ‘modern or 
postmodern’ societies characterized by a ‘guilt culture’ and people’s calculative involvements. 
Collectivistic countries, which generally are located in ‘the South’ (e.g. Venezuela, Colombia, 
Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, Chile and Singapore), are presented as ‘traditional’ societies 
characterized by a ‘shame culture’ and people’s moral involvements. When interpreting the 
combination of a ‘guilt culture’ and ’calculative involvement’ through the postcolonial lens it 
could be argued that bad conscience for eventual calculative involvements in Third World 
countries are justified by a notion of superiority called forth by rational Protestantism. At the 
same  time it  makes one  wonder  if  it  is not  the Western world  that  produces  or  at  least 
contributes to the production of a ‘shame culture’ by imposing their definition of ‘modernity’ and 
‘development’ on the rest of the world, and by making people believe that there is only one way 
 
to achieve economic success, namely, by mimicing Western culture. 
 
 
 
Masculinity: Can feminine values be modern after all? 
 
In his construction of the Masculinity/Femininity dimension (MAS), Hofstede proceeds from the 
presumption that ‘the duality of the sexes is a fundamental fact with which different societies 
cope in different ways’ (p. 279). The concept refers to the dominant sex roles pattern in the vast 
majority  of   both  traditional  and   modern   societies;  that  of   male  competitiveness   and 
assertiveness and female modesty and nurturance. While underscoring that this not necessarily 
means that men always behave in a more ‘masculine’ way than women and women in a more 
‘feminine’ way than men, he does however point out that statistically men as a rule will be more 
on the ‘masculine’ side and women more and the’ feminine’ side. By this he apparently means 
that men generally are more achievement-oriented while women are more care-oriented. 
According to Hofstede a problem with this is that the dominating patterns in a society also are 
transmitted to other institutions. The goal of the organizations does for instance affect the 
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distribution of labour over the sexes. Business organizations have goals of achievement, which 
correspond to the alleged achieving role of the male. 
Interestingly, this is the dimension where the opposition between the West (especially the 
Anglo-Germanic, Protestant world) and the rest of the World is the least clear. This is not only 
because, as Hofstede himself claims, it is the only dimension that is unrelated to national 
wealth, but rather because the US, the UK and Japan for once seem to be on the ‘wrong’ side, 
while the Netherlands along with the Scandinavian countries once again are depicted as ‘quite 
nice cultures’. At least one gets the feeling that he holds feminine culture in countries like 
Scandinavia and the Netherlands (his native country) as a model as it is more fair, egalitarian, 
and, to summarize, more human. 
However, MAS stands out as probably the least meaningful of all five dimensions and is 
also the one which has provoked most criticism over the years. Among other critiques it has 
been blamed for being both vague and contradictory. A common remark is that the dimension 
seems to include several types of ‘femininities’. Some scholars even reject this cultural 
designation altogether claiming instead that ‘quality of life’ more accurately describes these 
kinds of differences between countries (Adler, 1997). For his defense Hofstede claims that 
many scholars have misinterpreted its meaning, but, nevertheless, the claim that the dimension 
represents ‘the convergence in social gender roles’ is hard to accept. Because of the lack of 
meaning  of  that  dimension,  it  is  not  as  convincing  and  thus  not  very  significant  for  the 
‘disciplinary power’ brought forward by the general Hofstede discourse. From the postcolonial 
viewpoint, what can be perhaps most criticized here is the very choice of metaphor in the sense 
that the discussion of gender, similarly to that of culture, assumes the presence of essential 
characteristics. While the cultural (colonial) discourse distinguishes the world in mainly two 
parts, the West and the non-West, the gender discourse distinguishes the feminine from the 
masculine. The concern with the way representation influences the constitution of subjectivities 
is also one of the reasons why feminism is of crucial interest in postcolonial discourse (see 
Mohanty, 1984; Prasad & Prasad, 2001; Spivak, 1999). 
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Long-Term Orientation: Accounting for unexpected success 
 
Long-Term Orientation (LTO) is of particular interest since its elaboration was supposedly 
triggered by a will to be less ethnocentric – in terms of an acknowledged ‘Western bias’ (p. 352) 
- and do justice to more ‘Asian’ values. As Hofstede puts it, the Chinese Value Survey (CVS) 
that was used as a basis for this fifth dimension ‘was composed from a values inventory 
suggested by Eastern minds, which only partly covered the themes judged important in the 
West’ (p. 351). Although the methodology used to operationalize the dimension was directed by 
the same quantitativist worldview as that used for the first four, Hofstede seems to consider the 
setting-up of this fifth dimension as partly answering ‘the need for local, culturally fitting theories 
of management and organization’ (p. 462) in non-Western areas of the world – in this case Asia. 
Hofstede claims that ‘the relationship between certain Confucian values – as opposed to 
other equally Confucian values - and economic growth over these decades is a surprising, even 
sensational, finding’ (pp. 367-368). Still according to Hofstede, the LTO findings are evidence 
supporting the statement that there is ‘a relationship between Confucius’s teachings and 
economic growth in the latter part of the 20th century’, a statement which ‘had been suggested 
before’ but ‘never proven’ (p. 368). He contends that this ‘discovery’ – the ‘sensational’ nature of 
which is surely proportional to Hofstede’s initial preconception of these areas of the world as too 
backward to experience ‘development’ – was made possible by the fact that the CVS is ‘an East 
Asian  instrument’,  which  he  finds  ‘remarkable’  (ibid.).  He  forgets  to  underline  that  this 
‘instrument’ was not only used according to the dominant Western-based research paradigm, 
but was also initially designed with that mind-frame – if anything, it suggests that these ‘Eastern 
minds’ that designed it did so not only according to ‘Confucius’s teachings’. 
And then, there is the issue of African values, which have the honour to be addressed for 
slightly more than half a page in the 500+ page text. This is probably due to the assumed lack of 
‘modernity’ of African countries – the book is supposed to ‘explore the differences in thinking 
and social action that exist among members of more than 50 modern nations’ (p. xix). No matter 
how short Hofstede’s discussion of Africa is, it tells a great deal about the worldview he has – or 
wishes to convey. He starts by describing Africa as ‘a development economist’s headache’ (p. 
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369), with 9 of the 10 poorest countries in the world. To Hofstede’s credit, he did try to develop 
an additional cultural dimension grounded from specifically African values, using the same 
approach as with the CVS (ibid.): 
 
Ask Africans to develop a values questionnaire, administer this in both African 
and non-African countries, and see whether any new dimension emerges that 
might explain why Western recipes for development don’t seem to work in 
Africa. 
 
Alas, after developing an ecological factor analysis that produced six factors, and correlating the 
country scores on these factors with the four IBM dimensions, ‘no serious candidate [‘emerged’] 
for a new, African-inspired, cultural dimension’ (pp. 369-370). From Hofstede’s text, it does 
somehow feel as though Africans are ‘not worth’ their own dimension. Hofstede goes even 
further by suggesting an explanation for the underdevelopment of Africa broadly speaking, in 
terms of a bad combination as regards the existing dimensions. He states that African values 
contain some element that is ‘fiercely contrary to the high-LTO mind-set’ (p. 370), noticing that a 
certain factor ‘opposed the African to the Asian countries and thus did provide a possible 
explanation for their differences in development rate’ (ibid.). Hofstede’s final verdict on Africa 
states that ‘attributed wisdom that is not based on knowledge and education is a dubious 
foundation for the development of a country’, a judgement of value clearly suggesting that what 
is wrong with Africa is the backward, unmodern cultures that characterize it. This is perhaps the 
clearest – and most shocking - example of his will to blame everything on culture, hence 
allowing for a guilt-free Western subjectivity regarding the colonial and neo-colonial facts: ‘it’s all 
in their mental programming’. Ultimately, since it seems this latest feature was shared between 
Africans and Westerners, Hofstede suggests that the difference may lie in the ‘different 
associations with the word wisdom’ (ibid.). Additional evidence that his conclusions are not 
directly drawn on his findings, but also by strong preconceptions: when the findings seem to be 
the same for two ‘cultural groups’ that should, in Hofstede’s worldview, be very different, it is 
blamed on ‘different associations’ with some of the key terms used in the questionnaires. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
 
We have argued that cross-cultural management in general and Hofstede’s model in particular 
is subsumed under the dominant discourses of ‘modernity’, ‘development’, and ‘rational 
economy’, and the purpose of our paper has been to explore Hofstede’s second edition of 
Culture’s Consequences (2001) and the rhetoric he uses to legitimize the validity of his cultural 
dimensions – Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism, Masculinity and Long- 
Term Orientation - and discuss cultural consequences of such colonial discourse. We have 
taken a particular interest in his treatment of culture and in his binary construction of the five 
dimensions. His second edition can clearly be seen as yet another contribution for the 
strengthening of current cross-cultural management discourse and its idea of national culture as 
a stable, historically determined and essentialistic phenomenon. Moreover, our analysis of the 
text reveals that his binary oppositions tend to construct the world as characterized by a division 
between a ‘developed and modern’ side and a ‘traditional and backward’ side. Our contention is 
that, by presenting deep cultural values as a central explanatory factor for virtually anything - for 
instance, ‘innovation’, ‘intolerance’, or also even ‘wealth’ -, Hofstede’s vision of the world is one 
that greatly undermines the burdens of history, especially the colonial and neo-colonial facts, 
and thus tends to point to the idea that inequalities should be blamed on the people’s ‘collective 
programming of the mind’ (Hofstede, 2001: 9) alone. By approaching culture as essentialistic he 
fails to recognize that the ‘other is never simply given, never just found or encountered, but 
made’ (Fabian, 1986: 208), and that the description of Western people as ‘developed and 
modern’ and non-Western people as traditional, irrational and prone to mysticism is a discursive 
construction based on a colonial thinking. 
As cross-cultural management discourse becomes more and more institutionalized as 
legitimate knowledge, one can, with a Foucauldian lens, see this knowledge as contributing to 
producing both a guilt-free Western subjectivity and a collective cultural responsibility on the 
part of the people from so-called ‘developing countries’. Hence, Hofstede’s cultural model, with 
its regimes of biased stereotypes, ultimately serves the purpose of promoting the idea of the 
West as a world saviour by exporting its founding principles, such as democracy, economic 
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development, advanced technology and science. The sense of collective cultural responsibility 
for developmental failure that is implicitly attributed to the developing countries, on the other 
hand, is strengthened by the fact that many former diaspora students who have eventually 
become influential institutional actors in their countries of origin convey this worldview when 
they try to implement what they have learnt from the ‘more successful cultures’ in which they 
have received their superior education. Subjected to and disciplined by the discourse based on 
Western theory and method these scholars transmit their doubly legitimate knowledge (as the 
one of the academic élite and yet one that they, local people, have acquired) in the developing 
countries. 
Put together, this suggests that Western companies wishing to operate in certain developing 
countries (e.g. in Africa) would be quite right to believe that all their managers should come from 
Western (preferably Anglo-Protestant) cultures, that most of the organizing (presumably for all 
kinds of organizations), broadly speaking, should be taken care of by Westerners or Western- 
educated people, along models created in the West, unless there is, as Hofstede (p. 462) puts 
it, an ‘effort in theory-building, especially in those countries in which theories of modern man, 
management, organization, and society must be imported wholesale from abroad’. Another 
good way for the West to appropriate even more the resources of the developing countries. This 
may be stretching the implications of the discourse quite far, but isn’t it the worldview that we 
precisely see, on the part of not only Western managers but also Western-educated third-world 
managers – and often more on the part of the latter. The local ‘effort at theory-building’ that 
Hofstede calls for (p. 462) is most likely one that should be accomplished, in his mind, by those 
‘local’  researchers  who  share  his  worldview  that  one  can  map  cultures  through  a  few 
quantitative measures, like those ‘Eastern minds’ (p. 351) who designed the questionnaire 
meant to measure LTO. Hofstede’s claim that theory-building is so needed locally in developing 
countries suggests that the existing ‘local knowledge’ is deemed worthless for the ultimate 
purpose of development as fitting the Western standards in terms of what it implies for ‘modern 
man, management, organization, and society’ (p. 462). For Hofstede, it is alright if the ways of 
thinking, the local ‘minds’, as he would put it, are used with the purpose of determining a cultural 
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‘competitive advantage’, like in the case of Asia. That is, as long as the only scholarly 
contribution that ‘Eastern minds’ are supposed to offer is nothing that might interfere with 
Western ontology, but merely assistance in order to formulate the questions for a questionnaire. 
Many writers from the Euro-American center lean on their - and their like-minded colleagues' 
 
– belief in a 'scientific truth' and talk as if their statements can claim universal validity. The 
overconfidence in the quantitative methods' capacity of delineating such a scientific truth in 
combination with the appearance of success have favoured a textual attitude and multiple 
replications of the study, which have in turn reinforced the power of Hofstede's discourse. Our 
main contribution in this paper has been to expose how this powerful discourse constructs the 
world as divided between a developed and modern side and a traditional and backward side. 
We have thus contributed to those postcolonial studies that aim to dismantle the truth-claims of 
Eurocentric discourses (Spivak, 1988) and indulge in a critique of the philosophical discourse of 
modernity (Lazarus, 1999). By helping to disrupt ‘the stereotypical discourses through which the 
colonial formation reproduces itself’ (Smyth, 1997: 157), our analysis of Hofstede's framework 
has hopefully allowed for breaking the self-reinforcing circuit of knowledge production which, in 
our  opinion,  characterizes  current  cross-cultural  management  theories  in  general  and 
Hofstede's model in particular, and to open up for an alternative knowledge production which 
includes rather than excludes and banalizes rather than exoticizes the other. 
 
 
 
1 Unless stated otherwise, citations and page numbers from this section refer to Hofstede’s 2001 volume. 
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